
Main research question
When and why do restrictions on civil society and on religion move together?
And what does this mean for faith-based NGOs?
Closing Civic Space, Restrictions on Religion,
and Faith-Based NGOs
Andrew Heiss
Georgetown University in Qatar
ARNOVA 2026





Closing civic space
Restrictions on entry, funding, and advocacy


Closing civic space
Restrictions on entry, funding, and advocacy
Restrictions on religion
Limits on worship, registration, bans, and favoring one faith
Closing civic space
Restrictions on entry, funding, and advocacy
Restrictions on religion
Limits on worship, registration, bans, and favoring one faith



When and why do restrictions on civil society and on religion move together?
And what does this mean for faith-based NGOs?
Regime stability
NGOs can threaten states
Monitor elections, document abuses, organize protests, channel foreign money and ideas, stand in for the state
Governments respond with lawfare and bureaucracy, not (always) violence
Registration, foreign funding restrictions, reporting rules, vague laws (Christensen and Weinstein 2013; Chaudhry 2022; Chaudhry and Heiss 2022; Heiss 2026)
| If a regime that wants to stay in power has… | it restricts religion through… | and FBNGOs face… |
|---|---|---|
| No explicit identity goal | Control: registration, bans, and surveillance, the same tools it uses on NGOs | the same rules as any NGO |
| A religious identity | Control + favoritism for the majority religion | extra scrutiny if they’re a minority or foreign religion |
| A secular, non-religious identity | Additional control | extra scrutiny because they’re religious |
| Expectation | What we should see |
|---|---|
| 1. Civil society restriction and religious control go together | Countries that restrict civil society should also control religion |
| 2. Favoritism is unrelated to civil society restriction | Favoritism reflects a country’s religious makeup, not its regime: it barely changes with how closed a regime is, and isn’t correlated with civil society restriction once other factors are accounted for |
| 3. Secular identity makes closed regimes more restrictive | Closed regimes with a socialist, non-religious ideology should restrict civil society and religion more than other closed regimes |
Civil society restriction
V-Dem Core Civil Society Index (reversed, 0–1)
Religious control
15 Pew GRI questions (0–10)
Limits on worship, preaching, conversion, and missionaries; registration and bans; harassment and violence against religious groups (Pew Research Center 2025)
Religious favoritism
5 Pew GRI questions (0–10)
Official or favored religion, unequal privileges, government funding, required religious education, deference to religious authorities
162 countries, 2007–2022
Electoral competitiveness
Regime stability
Clean elections and free opposition parties
Low: Oman, Tajikistan, and Iran
High: Germany, Estonia, and Finland
Religious legitimation
Religious identity
Government justifies its rule with religion
None: 49% of country-years
Highest: Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey
Socialist legitimation
Secular identity
Government justifies its rule with socialism or communism
None: 36% of country-years
Highest: Cuba, Venezuela, and China
Predict all three outcomes together
Bayesian multilevel (ordered) multivariate beta regression with country and year effects
“What if” predictions: what if every country were as {Country X}?
How correlated are the outcomes after accounting for the explanatory variables?
Expectations 1 and 2: civil society restrictions move with religious control, not favoritism

Correlation between civil society restriction and types of religious restrictions
Favoritism’s correlation after accounting for other explanatory variables: 0.05
Expectations 1 and 2: favoritism barely moves

Predicted restriction if every country had the same electoral competitiveness, holding constant communist history, majority religion, religious diversity, wealth, and population
In double jeopardy if every country were closed: 34%;
if every country were open: 0.3%
Expectation 3: secular identity makes closed regimes more restrictive

Lines spreading apart indicate that ideology (religious or secular) matters more
Socialist legitimation makes closed regimes more restrictive; religious legitimation doesn’t
Secular route
No religious legitimation
Belarus, China, Cuba, Eritrea, Kazakhstan, Laos, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Vietnam
10 of 11 communist or post-communist
Religious route
Some religious legitimation
Algeria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Kuwait, Myanmar (Burma), Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen
13 of 14 Muslim-majority
20% of countries in 2022, up from 14% in 2007
Secular route
Suspicion of religion in general
China, Vietnam, Cuba, Central Asia
Religious route
Suspicion of minority and foreign religions
The Gulf, Iran, North Africa
FBNGOs face NGO laws and religion laws
Closing civic space
Religious organizations face a second set of restrictions
Religious freedom
Control and favoritism behave differently
Extra restrictions depend on religious nature/ideology of state