Double Jeopardy

Closing Civic Space, Restrictions on Religion,
and Faith-Based NGOs

Andrew Heiss

Georgetown University in Qatar

ARNOVA 2026

Double jeopardy

Catholic Charities logo

LDS Charities logo

World Vision logo

Islamic Relief logo

Muslim Charity logo

Dual restrictions

Closing civic space

Restrictions on entry, funding, and advocacy

Closing civic space

Closing civic space

Closing civic space

Closing civic space

Restrictions on entry, funding, and advocacy

Restrictions on religion

Limits on worship, registration, bans, and favoring one faith

Dual restrictions

Closing civic space

Restrictions on entry, funding, and advocacy

Restrictions on religion

Limits on worship, registration, bans, and favoring one faith

Line chart of the average Pew Government Restrictions Index across countries from 2007 to 2022. It rises from 2.7 to 3.8, with a small dip around 2014.

Double jeopardy

Scatterplot of country averages from 2007 to 2022, with religious restriction (Pew GRI, 0 to 10) on the x-axis and civil society restriction (1 minus CCSI, 0 to 1) on the y-axis. Points rise from the bottom left to the top right with a lot of spread. Dashed lines at a GRI of 4.5 and civil society restriction of 0.5 split the plot into four quadrants. Points in the top-right double jeopardy quadrant are red and include China, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Eritrea, and Turkmenistan. Many gold points in the bottom right restrict religion but not civil society, and some blue points in the top left do the reverse.

Double jeopardy

Line chart of the share of countries in double jeopardy each year from 2007 to 2022. It rises unevenly from 14% (22 countries) to 20% (32 countries).

Main research question

When and why do restrictions on civil society and on religion move together?

And what does this mean for faith-based NGOs?

Why restrict
religious NGOs?

Logic of civil society restrictions

Regime stability

NGOs can threaten states

Monitor elections, document abuses, organize protests, channel foreign money and ideas, stand in for the state

Governments respond with lawfare and bureaucracy, not (always) violence

Registration, foreign funding restrictions, reporting rules, vague laws (Christensen and Weinstein 2013; Chaudhry 2022; Chaudhry and Heiss 2022; Heiss 2026)

Logic of religious restrictions

Stability

Religion as vehicle for opposition movements

Identity
through faith

Privilege the nation’s faith, restrict its rivals

Identity
against faith

Push religion out of public life (assertive secularism)

Regime stability and identity

If a regime that wants to stay in power has… it restricts religion through… and FBNGOs face…
No explicit identity goal Control: registration, bans, and surveillance, the same tools it uses on NGOs the same rules as any NGO
A religious identity Control + favoritism for the majority religion extra scrutiny if they’re a minority or foreign religion
A secular, non-religious identity Additional control extra scrutiny because they’re religious

What leads to
double jeopardy?

Expectations

Expectation What we should see
1. Civil society restriction and religious control go together Countries that restrict civil society should also control religion
2. Favoritism is unrelated to civil society restriction Favoritism reflects a country’s religious makeup, not its regime: it barely changes with how closed a regime is, and isn’t correlated with civil society restriction once other factors are accounted for
3. Secular identity makes closed regimes more restrictive Closed regimes with a socialist, non-religious ideology should restrict civil society and religion more than other closed regimes

Outcome variables

Civil society restriction

V-Dem Core Civil Society Index (reversed, 0–1)

Religious control

15 Pew GRI questions (0–10)

Limits on worship, preaching, conversion, and missionaries; registration and bans; harassment and violence against religious groups (Pew Research Center 2025)

Religious favoritism

5 Pew GRI questions (0–10)

Official or favored religion, unequal privileges, government funding, required religious education, deference to religious authorities

162 countries, 2007–2022

Explanatory variables

Electoral competitiveness

Regime stability

Clean elections and free opposition parties

Low: Oman, Tajikistan, and Iran
High: Germany, Estonia, and Finland

Religious legitimation

Religious identity

Government justifies its rule with religion

None: 49% of country-years
Highest: Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey

Socialist legitimation

Secular identity

Government justifies its rule with socialism or communism

None: 36% of country-years
Highest: Cuba, Venezuela, and China

Fancy joint modeling

Predict all three outcomes together

Bayesian multilevel (ordered) multivariate beta regression with country and year effects

“What if” predictions: what if every country were as {Country X}?

How correlated are the outcomes after accounting for the explanatory variables?

Results

CS and control, not favoritism

Expectations 1 and 2: civil society restrictions move with religious control, not favoritism

Two posterior distributions of the correlation across countries between civil society restriction and each half of religious restriction. Religious control is centered around 0.66 and religious favoritism is centered around 0.21. The two distributions do not overlap.

Correlation between civil society restriction and types of religious restrictions

Favoritism’s correlation after accounting for other explanatory variables: 0.05

Closed regimes restrict both (but CS more)

Expectations 1 and 2: favoritism barely moves

Two line charts of average predicted restriction with 95% credible interval ribbons, from low to high electoral competitiveness, on the original scale of each outcome. Civil society restriction (0 to 1) falls steeply from 0.62 to 0.12. On the GRI (0 to 10), overall religious restriction falls from 4.0 to 2.8, control from 4.4 to 3.0, and favoritism barely changes (5.6 to 5.1).

Predicted restriction if every country had the same electoral competitiveness, holding constant communist history, majority religion, religious diversity, wealth, and population

In double jeopardy if every country were closed: 34%;
if every country were open: 0.3%

Ideology in closed regimes

Expectation 3: secular identity makes closed regimes more restrictive

Four small charts of average predicted outcomes for closed and open regimes (10th and 90th percentiles of electoral competitiveness), at no legitimation and high legitimation, for religious legitimation (left column) and socialist legitimation (right column). With socialist legitimation, the line for closed regimes rises while the line for open regimes stays flat: civil society restriction in closed regimes goes from 0.53 to 0.66, and religious control from 4.2 to 4.6. With religious legitimation, the closed and open lines are roughly parallel for religious control.

Lines spreading apart indicate that ideology (religious or secular) matters more

Socialist legitimation makes closed regimes more restrictive; religious legitimation doesn’t

Two routes into double jeopardy

Secular route

No religious legitimation

Belarus, China, Cuba, Eritrea, Kazakhstan, Laos, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Vietnam

10 of 11 communist or post-communist

Religious route

Some religious legitimation

Algeria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Kuwait, Myanmar (Burma), Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen

13 of 14 Muslim-majority

So what?

For faith-based NGOs

20% of countries in 2022, up from 14% in 2007

Secular route

Suspicion of religion in general

China, Vietnam, Cuba, Central Asia

Religious route

Suspicion of minority and foreign religions

The Gulf, Iran, North Africa

FBNGOs face NGO laws and religion laws

For research

Closing civic space

Religious organizations face a second set of restrictions

Religious freedom

Control and favoritism behave differently

Extra restrictions depend on religious nature/ideology of state

References

Carothers, Thomas, and Saskia Brechenmacher. 2014. Closing Space: Democracy and Human Rights Support Under Fire. Washington, D. C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
Chaudhry, Suparna. 2022. “The Assault on Civil Society: Explaining State Crackdown on NGOs.” International Organization 76 (3): 549–90. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818321000473.
Chaudhry, Suparna, and Andrew Heiss. 2022. “Closing Space and the Restructuring of Global Activism Causes and Consequences of the Global Crackdown on NGOs.” In Beyond the Boomerang: From Transnational Advocacy Networks to Transcalar Advocacy in International Politics, edited by Christopher L. Pallas and Elizabeth A. Bloodgood, 23–35. Tuscaloosa, Alabama: University of Alabama Press.
Christensen, Darin, and Jeremy M. Weinstein. 2013. “Defunding Dissent: Restrictions on Aid to NGOs.” Journal of Democracy 24 (2): 77–91. https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2013.0026.
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Majumdar, Samirah. 2024. “Government Restrictions on Religion Stayed at Peak Levels Globally in 2022.” Pew Research Center. December 18, 2024. https://www.pewresearch.org/religion/2024/12/18/government-restrictions-on-religion-stayed-at-peak-levels-globally-in-2022/.
Pew Research Center. 2025. “Dataset: Global Restrictions on Religion 2007-2022.” Application/pdf,text/csv,application/stata,text/plain. Pew Research Center. https://doi.org/10.58094/TECG-6392.
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